co m bat casks, and so me of rhein are co nsc ripted so ldiers . In addi tion , th ese tr o op s ca nnot be co m mi tte d quickl y to a conflict, becau se bureau cr atic reactio n tim e is relat ively slo w , and m an y o f these for ces are also currentl y dedicated to N AT O operation s."
It is important to di stinguish be twee n the tr o op s of these indi vidu al states and E U forces, becau se o nly E U fo rces can be deplo yed b y th e o rganizatio n. The capab ilities of th e E U as a whol e have been growing since 199 9, b ut to da te, th e " rea lity of E U depl o ym ent re mains co nfined to hum an itarian and resc ue tasks, peacek eeping tasks, and tasks fo r co m bat forces in crisis m an agem ent ." ? The curre nt effo rt fo r a Europe an "army" tak es the f0 11n of E U " ba ttlegro ups." The 1,500-man EU battlegroups can b e deployed wi th in 5 to 10 days of receiving order s and tailored to specific o peratio ns." Des pite the commitm ent of 100. 000 tro op s, 400 air craft , and 100 naval vessels to the p roj ect , it d oes n ot constitu te a stand ing army . These fo rces arc earma rk ed o nly, and can no t be de ploye d instantan eo usly. Provi sions of th e plan also give m ember states the right to refu se to de ploy th eir sha re of th e forces ," which co uld ham string any operati on.
As it stands, th e EU has no o fficial a11n y to use as military hard p o w er -whether as a "st ick" to deter acti on o r as the m eans to go to war. With out an army o r a m eans of depl o ying tro ops, th e EU h as no h ope of app lying military h ard power. Thi s is largely the res ult of tw o limits o n E U milita ry power: th e ex te n t of integratio n and th e re liance on th e U S for sec u rity .
The first and m ost important lim it o n milita ry hard power th rou gh a E urop ean a11ny is Eu rop ean integrati o n . By encompassing 27 states, alo ng with their lan gu ages, incompatibl e domestic legal struc tures, and nati on al identities and biases," the EU h as di scovered th at it is nea rly impossible to unite all of the me m b er sta tes u nde r a common for eign poli cy. Th e tl ilures of int egr ation we re o bv io us in Koso vo durin g its bid for ind ep en den ce in 200!); th e E U m ad e a blan ket state me nt in su ppo rt of Ko so vo , bur Spai n -having a Basqu e populatio n of its own clamoring for sovere ignty -refu sed to j o in th e co n u no n poli cy.11 The EU grap ple s with conflictin g political agen das and ev en multiple states w ith m ilitary neutralit y, as we ll as a hi story of co n flict and figh ting between th em . In the gu arded political clim ate after World W ar II , th e European nati o ns rebuilt and becam e fier cely protective of th ei r sovere ignty. In add itio n, man y of th e co u n tries' strong nati on alistic pride dates back to th e im pe rial age an d beyond; G rea t B rit ain , Spain, Germa ny. Fran ce, Italy, and o the r m embers have had a taste of em p ire and d omin ati on , and th eir citize ns rem em ber th eir nati on's heyday . National id entity is an everyday ro adb lo ck t o an int egr ated fore ign policy, and thus lim it s th e instituti on of a military fo rce.
T he U nite d Sta res is an important obstructio n to EU military power because th e EU has lon g reli ed on th e U S fo r its sec urity need s th rou gh NATO , crea ti ng a " transatlantic d ep enden ce. " 12 The Atla ntic alliance is an "ext ra insura nce poli cy" agains t aggressio n from m ember states or o u tside powers like Russia.':' While th e co llapse of t he U SSR and th e end of th e C old W ar " in th eory freed Europe from th e n eed for American lead ership, th e Balkan w ars of the 19 90s revealed that E uropea ns still d ep ended on the U S to ke ep peace on th eir own soil."!' Since U S fo rces m an aged m ost of th e major co nflicts th rou gh the 1990s, m an y EU co unt ries lim ited th ei r own d efen se spending. In Koso vo in ea rly 200R, th e Uni ted States, n ot th e E uropea n Uni o n , opposed Russian sup po rt for main ta ining Se rbia's co ntrol and ensur ed th e protec tio n of K oso vo 's new sovereignty. EU m em ber states (wi th the excep tion of Spain) supp o rted K osov o through NATO , not through any formal Europ ean institutio n . The EU had no coll ecti ve military hard powe r with which it could interv ene, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/11 and could not even reach a co nse nsus o n wh at actio n should he taken , leaving the confli ct largel y in another power's hands.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EU's ECONOMIC HARD POWER
The EU is the largest ec o no mic market in the world , with 458 million co nsume rs, more than the US and Japan combined ." Its members "create about one qu arter of th e world's gross nati onal produ ct and one fifth of the world' s commerce. "I" In additio n , the co m bined GDP of its member states is alm ost $ 12 triJlion 17 and with the integration of th eir curren cies, th ere is increasing demand for th e euro to tak e ov er as an alternative int ern ational reserve currency. IS The EU is now an econ omic giant, with the currency, the market, and the eco no m ic power to prove it.
The EU is also qui ckl y becoming an ec on omic regulatory power becau se of its ability to en courage other countries to adopt its standards and its talent for using glob alization for its own ends. The EU can refuse acce ss to its m arket -a hu ge blow to any compauy -unl ess a country adopts its produ ction standards; the organization has also subsidized the adoption of th ose standards in dev eloping co unt ries, m aking it free o r at least affordable to comply with the regulati ons." As th e number of countries involved in th e EU's regulated market increases, it can exe rt gre ater pressure on th e nations th at have not complied. As a result of EU-established standards, farm ers e ven outside of Europe are refusing to plant biot ech crops like genetically engineered com , and American companies have sto pped using ethanol in th eir skin care products." While these seem like in con sequential changes compared to the extent of th e global market, the (l ct that the EU can influence American standards and en courage farm ers to choose more expensive production options means th at the EU is successfully establishing itself as an economic "norm setter. ""I
The EU can use the se resources as econ omic hard power. Preferential m arket access has been used to gain regulatory co ncessio ns, but it also provides a powerful inc entive fo r foreign states to support other EU goals. For example , the EU denied China access to its armaments m ark et throu gh a trad e embargo after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989; the embargo help ed influenc e C hi na's gradual improvements in protecting human rights until the ban was Iified .:" However, th e EU has become incre asingl y un willing to use sanctio ns to en act its poli cies. The sent im ent among Europeans is th at since "governments can evade sanctions' effects [and] th e real victims are likel y to he innocent citizens of targeted nation s,,,", sancti on s sho uld not be used . The EU can also m anipulate developm ent assistan ce to influence other countries, espe cially in th e developing world . It is the world's " largest donor of 'development assistance,"?' granting $44 biJlion in 20 03, almost three times as much as the US ."; By granting or withholding the se funds in respon se to an other nati on's poli cies, the EU might wield greater influence; however , the EU doe s not use de velopment assistance for th e sam e reasons it do es not impose sancti on s. The EU does not care to punish citiz ens for the actions of their government, and thu s does not employ these m eth ods. Though the EU has grea t potential for using econo m ic hard power, it ch oo ses to rely on others means of influence .
How DOES THE EU COMMAND WITH SOFT POWER?
The EU has become an expert at usin g soft power instead of hard power to achieve its go als intemarionally. Soft power allows a nation to "obtain the outcomes it wants ... becau se other countries w ant to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, [and] The Soft Power Dilemma aspir ing to its level of prosperi ty and ope nness ."~b A nation's soft po wer relies o n its ability to maint ain political policies that "shape th e pr efe ren ces of o tliers ,"~7 and 0 11 the in tern ation al reputation it ca n create. The E U is unique in its reliance 011 soft po we r rath e r than hard powe r; trad itio nally, the great globa l powers have relied 011 hard po we r capabilities like a large standing al1 ny to give th em legitimacy. The EU has no suc h capability . and yet it con tin ues to ac t as a m ajor playe r. It represents a ne w kind of grea t power: o ne th at uses econom ic ben efits and soft po w er po licies to work in its own natio nal int er est, gr;lrIt huma nitarian aid, and atte m pt to solve internatio nal co nflicts. The EU has fo ur chi ef m eans of em ploy ing soft po wer: filling the power vacu urn left by mi strust of th e US, making its ideals attrac tive to th e rest of th e world, mai nta ining its int ern ati onal repu tat ion , and capitalizin g on th e appea l of e nlargeme nt.
According to J ohn M cC ol1n ick , th e E U " relies up on soft power to ex press itself and to ac hieve its objectives, and . . .finds itself at a m oral adva ntage in an inte rna tio na l environm ent where violence as a means of ac hievi ng inf uence is detested and rejec te d. ,,~s Alth ou gh int ern ational violen ce has not gon e co m pletely o ut of style as M cC ol1nick suggests, th e m odern political clima te is condu cive to th e EU's focus o n soft power if th e EU can prove th at th is kind of influe nce is effective. T he world's o nly rea l supe rpo wer, th e U S, has w orn ou t mu ch of its welcome o n th e o ther side of th e world ; th e U nited Sta tes' "war o n terro r" is becomi ng increasin gly unpopul ar and the co untry is no w regarded as a " b ull in th e glo bal chi na sho p ." 29 T his is a co nsequence of wielding hard power unilaterally and displaying littl e reg ard for th e capabilities of ot her poorly armed na tio ns . Hard po wer and unilateralism have lost th eir credi bility as th e only mean s of obtai ning po wer, and the EU capitalizes o n th is disres pec t for pol itical tools associated with th e Unite d States. Th e EU has also prove d th at it is wi lling to flex its political m uscles in interna tio na l institutio ns, eve n w hen it mea ns opposi ng th e United States. In 200 I, th e EU used its m ember states' 15 vo tes to rem o ve th e U ni ted States from th e U nited N ation s C o mmissio n o n Human R ights, as protest against th e U S' refusal to join the Int ern ation al Criminal Court and th e glo bal landmine ban, as well as its cont inued use of th e death pe nalty. B y stand ing up to th e U nited States, th e EU signa led that it can be po werful in its ow n rig ht, an d th at th e hard power tools used by th e Un ited States are not th e o nly meth od to influence interna tio nal politics.
T he E U 's stand ards, ideals, and struc ture have becom e increasingly attractive to the o utside world. N ot o nly has th e orga niza tio n ex te nded its eco no mic reach, but it has also expa nde d the acceptan ce of its politi cal culture. As th e largest source of humanitari an aid , prov iding 47 percent of th e world to tal in 2001, th e EU " b uys good wi ll and thus augments [its] soft po wer even in regio ns where it has n o obv io us o r dir ect geopolitical int er est," 30 All o ver th e world, ot he r co un tries are ado pting E U standa rds and policy fram eworks, eve n witho ut the EU provid ing eco no mic ince ntives . For exa m ple, th e E U 's poli cy o n personal data privacy -strictly limi ting th e way th at stat es ca n use personal info n ua tio n -has been adopted in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, C hile, Japan, Peru , and Uruguay..ll Suc h policy inheritan ces ca n enhance respec t for EU idea ls in thes e co unt ries, without th e EU di rec tly int erven ing in th eir politics. Th e E U has engi neered a un iqu e reputatio n as an economi c giant wit h a "business first" attitude and a w illingness to help developing co untries. T his grant s th e orga n izatio n a moral high gr ound fro m whic h it can critiq ue th e Unit ed States and pursue its o w n goal s, like fostering econ omic freedoms, protecting hum an rig hts, and allo w in g thi rd world countri es to develop and j o in the int ernatio nal communiry.
T he E U' s reputation as a m ult ilateral organi zation is on e of its gre atest asset s, beca use http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/11
it serves as a m odel for a new ty pe o f regi on al instituti on and can tail or its resp o nse to ev ery internati onal political dilemma . The EU can "obtain th e outcomes it want s. . .becau se other co u ntries wa n t to foll o w it, ad miri ng its values. em ulating its exa m ple, land] aspi ring to its le vel o f prosper ity and ope n ness." . 11 The Asso ciati o n of So u t heast Asian N atio ns (ASEAN) has an no u nced its int entions to form a " couunon m arket in go o ds, services, capital, and lab or by 2020," .1-' a mo ve inspired by Eu rop ean success . Othe r regional o rga nizatio ns like th e African Unio n an d the So ut h Am erica n C o m m u nity of N at ion s also lo ok to th e EU for guidan ce , and "a ffinities with th eir institu tional cultures... are potentially important avenu es for Europea n influ ence in th ose regions ." :" In additi o n, th e EU ca n choose to be represented in ev ery pol itical conve rsatio n by th e me m be r state w ho se na tio nal id entiry o r polit ical stru cture is m o re closely aligned with the nati on th e EU wants to influ en ce . Other co un tries are m or e likely to come to th e d iplomatic table if th ey feel th at th e EU has an appreciation for its ne ed s; in return , th e EU can w ield in flue nce in nl<ln y o the r parts of th e world . In its im m ediate neighborhood. th e EU's 1I10st effective use of soft pow er is the influen ce it can exert b y th e suggestio n of enlargeru ent." In order to rec ei ve the ben efits of EU m em bersh ip , potent ial members ado pt EU sta nda rds, cha nge th eir govern me ntal struct ures, and adj ust th eir foreign and domestic pol icies to align more carefully wi th th e EU . Th e two most recent additions to the EU , Romania and Bul garia, m ade hu ge co ncessio ns to j oin ; th e EU made th e " provision o f eco no mic aid partl y d ep en d e nt o n progress in area s such as jud icial and adm inistra tive reform":" in both co u nt ries, enco ur aging them to ado p t fair pr act ice law s and restru cture th ei r co urt system s. T hey resp o nded to th ese pressures and a num ber of o the r co nd itio ns, and success fully j oined th e E U in January o f 20 07 . Another exam ple of th e soft po wer influ ence that e nlarge ment can have is th e effec t th e EU has had on Turkey. Although Turkey enjoys a trad e agr eem en t that gra n ts it m ost of th e co m mercial pr ivileges o f E U membership , th e co un try still see ks to j oin the E U. In respo nse to consideratio n of its m embership , Turkey has made impro vements in human rig hts, reformed its law s o n the free do m o f ex pressio n, limited the rol e of the an n y in its national po litics, and imp ro ved its elec to ral processes." T he co u ntry had " d rastically revised laws an d po licies on such sensitive issues as th e de ath pe nalty , th e tre atm ent of et hnic mino riti es, and th e ro le of th e m ilitary' ? " even before th e E U had agreed to disc uss its membership; th e elusive ide a of EU membership w as eno ugh to spur hu ge ch an ges in Turkey's gov ernment witho u t any fo rma l ne got iations w ith the EU . T he sugges tio n of e nla rge me nt, inclusion , and int egration is a powerful to ol; oth er countries want th e suc cess and influ ence th at the E U has crea ted for itself, and th e m ost dir ect m ean s of o btain ing it is to join th e EU.
IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN SOFT POWER
In Iran , th e EU has taken th e lead in negotiati ons regarding the cessatio n of th e nucl ear pr o gram, The dipl omat ic ne goti ati on s, beginning in early 2003, hop ed to avoi d an oth er m ilitary con frontation in th e M iddle East, pr e vent Iran fro m o btai ning military nu clear cap abilities, and protect the Nucl ear Proliferation Treaty." By combi ning th e EU-3 (G rea t Brit ain , G ermany. and Fran ce) along wi t h th e U nit ed Stat es, Ru ssia, and China (altoge the r th e EU-3 + 3) and work ing in co nj unct io n w ith UN Sec uri ty Co unci l in vol vem ent , th e EU hoped to attain consensus among th e major po we rs an d project a united policy against Irani an nucl ear proliferati on. In Octo be r of 2003 , the EU-3 + 3 signe d th e nego tiations' first agreement: in return for Europ ean reco gnition o f 1r.1I1 's right to light wa te r reacto rs for m anufa cturing en ergy as w ell as other trad e programs , the Ira n ian government agree d
The Soft Power Dilemma to suspend nucl ear acti vities and allow Internati on al Atomic En ergy Agen cy ([AE A) inspecto rs int o the country. 40 Despite early successes, th e negotiation s broke down in 2006; Iran resumed th e produ cti on of enri ch ed uranium in April of th at year and ann ounced its int enti on to install 3,000 ce ntrifuges -e no ug h to mo ve forward w ith a nucl ear pr ogram ." The EU -3+ 3 has since struggled w ith Iran 's rejection o fI AEA/ U N inspectors in early 200 7 and threats to the exist en ce of Israel, amo ng a ho st of smaller co nflicts and pr obl ems. " T o date, no satisfactory agreement has been reached, th ou gh the neg oti ations are co nti nuing. It seem s unlik ely that the EU-J +J will be able to obtain an agreem ent acceptable to all parties, since both sides hold powerful GIrds and escalation m ay be immi ne nt.' :' In tenus of limiting nuclear proliferation , th e negotiati on s have been a failure.
But reaching an una ssailable agreement was not necessarily th e EU 's onl y goa l in Iran . If one of th e EU 's obje ctiv es was to offer itself as a part of the negoti ations and promote the o rganizatio n as a reasonable alte rnative to the United States, it has projected th at image successfully." Finding a reason able soluti on to Iranian nuclear demands is de sirable , but the EU also has m or e pragmati c go als: in creasing the po w er of its own reputation and the prestige of its international poli cies.' ; By leadin g the Iranian negotiations, the EU bolst ers its reputation, on e of its most influ ential soft power advantages, and carves o ut an important place for itself in th e mo st pre ssing co nflicts o f inte rn atio nal sec ur ity and defense . Even though th e EU has not been wh olly successful in co m pleting its stated obj ecti ves, it will benefit from representing both th e EU and the W estern world o n the int ern ational stage.
THE SOFT POWER DILEMMA: CAN IT WORK?
The sour ces of Europ ean power have been identified , but it remains to be seen whether its relian ce on soft po wer is a formula for lastin g internati on al influe nce . A number o f problems remain for the EU regarding the effectiv eness of its power and th e limits of its diplomati c tools, and th e E U 's international power is still being defined. Iran is an exampl e o f the limit s of Europ ean power on th e global stage; the nucl ear co nflict is one of the most dangerou s situatio ns that the world faces, and th e EU has shown that it canno t handle it with soft power alon e. Its participation in the negoti ations has co nt ributed to its gro wing reputation, but the EU was not able to solve the co nflict or suc ceed where th e United Stat es has not.
The problem of sec urity has th e potential to derail the E U 's reliance o n soft power. The Europ ean Uni on's relatio nshi p w ith the Un ited States is espec ially troubling, because the EU needs the US to provide its basic military legitimacy. The E U will co ntinue to rely on the US o r another great power with military presence as lon g as it is without an arulY of its own, whi ch gives it mu ch less leverag e internationall y. The EU is associated with American milita ry o pe ratio ns in m an y co untries by its o w n accord or throu gh NATO, and if th ese operati on s go aw ry, th e EU is also respon sible . Even w hen the EU is not in agre em ent with the United States' military policies, they have few means of o pposing th ese decisions. As member states' defense budgets continu e to declin e," it is qu estionable that they will be able to pr otect th emselves as needed.
But for no w, th e EU o ccupies th e perfect p osition ; its sec urity need s are pro vided for with very little effort, and its poli cies have aligned closel y with the United States. In situations wh ere EU and US policies have differed, th e EU has not been co m pletely tied to American decisions. In Iraq, many EU countries refused to pr ovide tro op s o r have since recalled th em in the face of what many European s see as Am eri can hlilur e. As a result , th e http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/11 U S has been forced to act unilaterally , wh ich undermines the internati onal conununiry's go odwiJJ. Thi s vacuum is a p otential space for the EU to fill, sin ce it does not h ave the military capabiliti es to act on its own lik e th e United Stat es and is an in stitution found ed Oil mulrilareralisni . In fact, non-integration has its benefits. The diffi culties of integrati on assur e o the r nations th at they ne ed not fear a militant or ag gres sive EU , making them m ore likel y to invest in th e European market and C0111e to the diplomatic tabl e. The EU wields 27 votes in international institutions instead of only o ne , maintain s a reputation of unaffected comm erce and multilareralism, and represents th e "good cop " abroad, a perfect situati on for an o rganizatio n with the EU 's goals.:" Man y countries are att racted to th e idea of a co alitio n of cooperati ve states, especially o ne th at has proved to be so economically su cce ssful . The ex iste nce of the union implies that it ca n manage diplomatic conflicts, balance differences in foreign polic y, and allow for national identities and biases, whi ch are all important for resol ving an y int e rn atio nal conflic t. The m aintenance of m ember sta te so ve reignty is actu<Ill y a boon , becau se it reminds other countries that th e EU is f.lI11ili ar w ith cooperating and balancing national interests. Though so ft power dearl y has its limits -<IS sugge sted by the ne gotiations with Iran -the EU still has sig nifican t influence in international afEtirs.
